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Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott introduced not one, but three, revolutionary
ideas in their 1982 paper, “Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations.” The ﬁrst
idea, which builds on prior work by Lucas and Prescott (1971), is that business
cycles can be studied using dynamic general equilibrium models. These models
f e a t u r ea t o m i s t i ca g e n t sw h oo p e r a t ei nc o m p e t i t i v em a r k e t sa n df o r mr a t i o n a l
expectations about the future. The second idea is that it is possible to unify
business cycle and growth theory by insisting that business cycle models must be
consistent with the empirical regularities of long-run growth. The third idea is
that we can go way beyond the qualitative comparison of model properties with
stylized facts that dominated theoretical work on macroeconomics until 1982.
We can calibrate models with parameters drawn, to the extent possible, from
microeconomic studies and long-run properties of the economy, and we can use
these calibrated models to generate artiﬁcial data that we can compare with actual
data.
It is not surprising that a paper with so many new ideas has shaped the
macroeconomics research agenda of the last two decades. The wave of models that
ﬁrst followed Kydland and Prescott’s (1982) work were referred to as “real business
cycle” models because of their emphasis on the role of real shocks, particularly
technology shocks, in driving business ﬂuctuations. But real business cyle (RBC)
models also became a point of departure for many theories in which technology
shocks do not play a central role.
In addition, RBC-based models came to be widely used as laboratories for
policy analysis in general and for the study of optimal ﬁscal and monetary pol-
icy in particular.1 These policy applications reﬂected the fact that RBC models
1See Chari and Kehoe (1999) for a review of the literature on optimal ﬁscal and monetary
policy in RBC models.
2represented an important step in meeting the challenge laid out by Robert Lucas
(Lucas (1980)) when he wrote that “One of the functions of theoretical economics
is to provide fully articulated, artiﬁcial economic systems that can serve as labora-
tories in which policies that would be prohibitively expensive to experiment with
in actual economies can be tested out at much lower cost. [...] Our task as I see
it [...] is to write a FORTRAN program that will accept speciﬁce c o n o m i cp o l i c y
rules as ‘input’ and will generate as ‘output’ statistics describing the operating
characteristics of time series we care about, which are predicted to result from
these policies.”
In the next section I brieﬂy review the properties of RBC models. It would
have been easy to extend this review into a full-blown survey of the literature. But
I resist this temptation for two reasons. First, King and Rebelo (1999) already
contains a discussion of the RBC literature. Second, and more important, the
best way to celebrate RBC models is not to revel in their past, but to consider
their future. So I devote section III to some of the challenges that face the theory
ediﬁce that has built up on the foundations laid by Kydland and Prescott in 1982.
Section IV concludes.
2. Real Business Cycles
Kydland and Prescott (1982) judge their model by its ability to replicate the
main statistical features of U.S. business cycles. These features are summarized
in Hodrick and Prescott (1980) and are revisited in Kydland and Prescott (1990).
Hodrick and Prescott detrend U.S. macro time series with what became known as
the “HP ﬁlter.” They then compute standard deviations, correlations, and serial
correlations of the major macroeconomic aggregates.
Macroeconomists know their main ﬁndings by heart. Investment is about three
times more volatile than output, and nondurables consumption is less volatile
3than output. Total hours worked and output have similar volatility. Almost all
macroeconomic variables are strongly procyclical, i.e. they show a strong con-
temporaneous correlation with output.2 Finally, macroeconomic variables show
substantial persistence. If output is high relative to trend in this quarter, it is
likely to continue above trend in the next quarter.
Kydland and Prescott (1982) ﬁnd that simulated data from their model show
the same patterns of volatility, persistence, and comovement as are present in
U.S. data. This ﬁnding is particularly surprising, because the model abstracts
from monetary policy, which economists such as Friedman (1968) consider an
important element of business ﬂuctuations.
Instead of reproducing the familiar table of standard deviations and correla-
tions based on simulated data, I adopt an alternative strategy to illustrate the
performance of a basic RBC model. This strategy is similar to that used by the
Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) to compare diﬀerent recessions (see Hall et al. (2003)) and to the meth-
ods used by Burns and Mitchell (1946) in their pioneer study of the properties of
U.S. business cycles.
I start by simulating the model studied in King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988) for
5,000 periods, using the calibration in Table 2, column 4 of that paper. This model
is a simpliﬁed version of Kydland and Prescott (1982). It eliminates features that
are not central to their main results: time-to-build in investment, non-separable
utility in leisure, and technology shocks that include both a permanent and a
transitory component. I detrend the simulated data with the HP ﬁlter. I identify
recessions as periods in which output is below the HP trend for at least three
consecutive quarters.3
2A notable exception is the trade balance which is countercyclical. See Baxter and Crucinni
(1993).
3Interestingly, applying this method to U.S. data produces recession dates that are similar to
4Figure 1 shows the average recession generated by the model. All variables are
represented as deviations from their value in the quarter in which the recession
starts, which I call period zero. This ﬁgure shows that the model reproduces the
ﬁrst-order features of U.S. business cycles. Consumption, investment, and hours
worked are all procyclical. Consumption is less volatile than output, investment
is much more volatile than output, and hours worked are only slightly less volatile
than output. All variables are persistent. One new piece of information I obtain
from Figure 1 is that recessions in the model last for about one year, just as in
the U.S. data.
3. Open Questions in Business Cycle Research
I begin by brieﬂy noting two well-known challenges to RBC models. The ﬁrst is
explaining the behavior of asset prices. The second is understanding the Great
Depression. I then discuss research on the causes of business cycles, the role of
labor markets, and on explanations for the strong patterns of comovement across
diﬀerent industries.
The Behavior of Asset Prices Real business cycle models are arguably suc-
cessful at mimicking the cyclical behavior of macroeconomic quantities. However,
Mehra and Prescott (1985) show that utility speciﬁcations common in RBC mod-
els have counterfactual implications for asset prices. These utility speciﬁcations
are not consistent with the diﬀerence between the average return to stocks and
those chosen by the NBER dating committee. The NBER dates for the beginning of a recession
and the dates obtained with the HP procedure (indicated in parentheses) are as follows: 1948-
IV (1949-I), 1953-II (1953-IV), 1960-II (1960-III), 1969-IV (1970-I), 1973-III (1974-III), 1981-III
(1981-IV), 1990-III (1990-IV), and 2001-I (2001-III). The NBER dates include 1980-I, which
is not selected by the HP procedure. In addition, the HP procedure includes three additional
recessions starting in 1962-III, 1986-IV, 1995-I. None of the latter episodes involved a fall in
output.
5bonds. This “equity premium puzzle” has generated a voluminous literature, re-
cently reviewed by Mehra and Prescott (2003).
Although a generally accepted resolution of the equity premium puzzle is cur-
rently not available, many researchers view the introduction of habit formation
as an important step in addressing some of the ﬁrst-order dimensions of the puz-
zle. Lucas (1978)-style endowment models, in which preferences feature simple
forms of habit formation, are consistent with the diﬀerence in average returns
between stocks and bonds. However, these models generate bond yields that are
too volatile relative to the data.4
Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) show that simply introducing habit
formation into a standard RBC model does not resolve the equity premium puz-
zle. Fluctuations in the returns to equity are very small, because the supply of
capital is inﬁnitely elastic. Habit formation introduces a strong desire for smooth
consumption paths, but these smooth paths can be achieved without generating
ﬂuctuations in equity returns. Boldrin, et al. (2001) modify the basic RBC model
to reduce the elasticity of capital supply. In their model investment and con-
sumption goods are produced in diﬀerent sectors and there are frictions to the
reallocation of capital and labor across sectors. As a result, the desire for smooth
consumption introduced by habit formation generates volatile equity returns and
a large equity premium.
What Caused the Great Depression? The Great Depression was the most
important macroeconomic event of the 20th century. Many economists interpret
the large output decline, stock market crash, and ﬁnancial crisis that occurred
between 1929 and 1933 as a massive failure of market forces that could have been
4Early proponents of habit formation as a solution to the equity premium puzzle include
Sundaresan (1989), Constantinides (1990), and Abel (1990). See Campbell and Cochrane (1999)
for a recent discussion of the role of habit formation in consumption-based asset pricing models.
6prevented had the government played a larger role in the economy. The dramatic
increase in government spending as a fraction of GDP that we have seen since the
1930s is partly a policy response to the Great Depression.
In retrospect, it seems plausible that the Great Depression resulted from an
unusual combination of bad shocks compounded by bad policy. The list of shocks
includes large drops in the world price of agricultural goods, instability in the
ﬁnancial system, and the worst drought ever recorded. Bad policy was in abundant
supply. The central bank failed to serve as lender of last resort as bank runs forced
many U.S. banks to close. Monetary policy was contractionary in the midst of
the recession. The Smoot-Hawley tariﬀ of 1930, introduced to protect farmers
from declines in world agricultural prices, sparked a bitter tariﬀ war that crippled
international trade. The federal government introduced a massive tax increase
through the Revenue Act of 1932. Competition in both product and labor markets
was undermined by government policies that permitted industry to collude and
increased the bargaining power of unions. Using rudimentary data sources to sort
out the eﬀects of these diﬀerent shocks and diﬀerent policies is a daunting task,
but signiﬁcant progress is being made.5
What Causes Business Cycles? One of the most diﬃcult questions in macro-
economics asks, what are the shocks that cause business ﬂuctuations? Long-
standing suspects are monetary, ﬁscal, and oil price shocks. To this list Prescott
(1986) adds technology shocks, and argues that they “account for more than half
the ﬂuctuations in the postwar period with a best point estimate near 75%”.
The idea that technology shocks are the central driver of business cycles is con-
troversial. Prescott (1986) computes total factor productivity (TFP) and treats
it as a measure of exogenous technology shocks. However, there are reasons to
5See Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2005), Cole and Ohanian (1999, 2004), and the
January 2002 issue of the Review of Economic Dynamics and the references therein.
7distrust TFP as a measure of true shocks to technology. TFP can be forecast us-
ing military spending (Hall (1988)), or monetary policy indicators (Evans (1992)),
both of which are variables that are unlikely to aﬀect the rate of technical progress.
This evidence suggests that TFP, as computed by Prescott, is not a pure exoge-
nous shock, but has some endogenous components. Variable capital utilization,
considered by Basu (1996) and Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1996); vari-
ability in labor eﬀort, considered by Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1993);
and changes in markup rates, considered by Jaimovich (2004a), drive important
wedges between TFP and true technology shocks. These wedges imply that the
m a g n i t u d eo ft r u et e c h n o l o g ys h o c k si sl i k e l yt ob em u c hs m a l l e rt h a nt h a to ft h e
TFP shocks used by Prescott.
Burnside and Eichenbaum (1996), King and Rebelo (1999), and Jaimovich
(2004a) argue that the fact that true technology shocks are smaller than TFP
shocks does not imply that technology shocks are unimportant. Introducing mech-
anisms such as capacity utilization and markup variation in RBC models has two
eﬀects. First, these mechanisms make true technology shocks less volatile than
TFP. Second, they signiﬁcantly amplify the eﬀects of technology shocks. This
ampliﬁcation allows models with these mechanisms to generate output volatility
similar to the data with much smaller technology shocks.
Another controversial aspect of RBC models is the role of technology shocks
in generating recessions. The NBER business cycle dating committee deﬁnes a
recession as “a signiﬁcant decline in economic activity spread across the economy,
lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real income, em-
ployment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales” (Hall et al. (2003)).
Figure 2 shows a histogram of annualized quarterly growth rates of U.S. real GDP.
In absolute terms, output fell in 15 percent of the quarters between 1947 and 2005.
Most RBC models require declines in TFP in order to replicate the declines in
8output observed in the data.6 Macroeconomists generally agree that expansions
in output, at least in the medium to long run, are driven by TFP increases that
derive from technical progress. In contrast, the notion that recessions are caused
by TFP declines meets with substantial skepticism because, interpreted literally,
it means that recessions are times of technological regress.
Gali (1999) has fueled the debate on the importance of technology shocks as
a business cycle impulse. Gali uses a structural VAR that he identiﬁes by as-
suming that technology shocks are the only source of long-run changes in labor
productivity. He ﬁnds that in the short run, hours worked fall in response to a
positive shock to technology. This ﬁnding clearly contradicts the implications of
basic RBC models. King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988) and King (1991) discuss in
d e t a i lt h ep r o p e r t yt h a tp o s i t i v et e c h n o l o g ys h o c k sr a i s eh o u r sw o r k e di nR B C
models. Gali’s results have sparked an animated, ongoing debate. Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson (2003) ﬁnd that Gali’s results are not robust to spec-
ifying the VAR in terms of the level, as opposed to the ﬁrst-diﬀerence, of hours
worked. Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2004) show that Gali’s ﬁndings can be
the result of misspeciﬁcation.7 Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (1999) and Francis
and Ramey (2001) complement Gali’s results. They ﬁnd them robust to using
diﬀerent data and VAR speciﬁcations.
Alternatives to Technology Shocks T h ed e b a t eo nt h er o l eo ft e c h n o l o g y
shocks in business ﬂuctuations has inﬂuenced and inspired research on models in
which technology shocks are either less important or play no role at all. Generally,
these lines of research have been strongly inﬂuenced by the methods and ideas
6One exception is the model proposed in King and Rebelo (1999), which minimizes the need
for TFP declines in generating recessions. This model requires strong ampliﬁcation properties
that result from a highly elastic supply of labor and utilization of capital.
7See Gali and Rabanal (2005) for a discussion of some of the misspeciﬁcation issues.
9developed in the RBC literature. In fact, many of these alternative theories take
the basic RBC model as their point of departure.
Oil Shocks
Movements in oil and energy prices are loosely associated with U.S. recessions
(see Barsky and Killian (2004) for a recent discussion). Kim and Loungani (1992),
Rotemberg and Woodford (1996), and Finn (2000) have studied the eﬀects of
energy price shocks in RBC models. These shocks improve the performance of
RBC models, but they are not a major cause of output ﬂuctuations. Although
energy prices are highly volatile, energy costs are too small as a fraction of value
added for changes in energy prices to have a major impact on economic activity.
Fiscal Shocks
Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), Baxter and King (1993), Braun (1994),
and McGrattan (1994), among others, have studied the eﬀect of tax rate and
government spending shocks in RBC models. These ﬁscal shocks improve the
ability of RBC models to replicate both the variability of consumption and hours
worked, and the low correlation between hours worked and average labor pro-
ductivity. Fiscal shocks also increase the volatility of output generated by RBC
models. However, there is not enough cyclical variation in tax rates and govern-
ment spending for ﬁscal shocks to be a major source of business ﬂuctuations.
W h i l ec y c l i c a lm o v e m e n t si ng o v e r n m e n ts p e n d i n ga r es m a l l ,p e r i o d so fw a ra r e
characterized by large, temporary increases in government spending. Researchers
such as Ohanian (1997) show that RBC models can account for the main macro-
economic features of war episodes: a moderate decline in consumption, a large
decline in investment, and an increase in hours worked. These features emerge
naturally in a RBC model in which government spending is ﬁnanced with lump
10sum taxes. Additional government spending has to be, sooner or later, ﬁnanced
by taxes. Household wealth declines due to the increase in the present value of
household tax liabilities. In response to this decline, households reduce their con-
sumption and increase the number of hours they work, i.e., reduce their leisure.
This increase in hours worked produces a moderate increase in output. Since the
momentary marginal utility of consumption is decreasing, households prefer to
pay for the war-related taxes by reducing consumption both today and in the fu-
ture. Given that the reduction in consumption today plus the expansion in output
are generally smaller than the government spending increase, there is a decline
in investment. Cooley and Ohanian (1997) use a RBC model to compare the
welfare implications of diﬀerent strategies of war ﬁnancing. Ramey and Shapiro
(1998) consider the eﬀects of changes in the composition of government spending.
Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004) study the eﬀects of large temporary
increases in government spending in the presence of distortionary taxation.
Investment-speciﬁc Technical Change
One natural alternative to technology shocks is investment-speciﬁct e c h n o l o g -
ical change. In standard RBC models, a positive technology shock makes both
labor and existing capital more productive. In contrast, investment-speciﬁct e c h -
nical progress has no impact on the productivity of old capital goods. Rather, it
makes new capital goods more productive or less expensive, raising the real return
to investment.
We can measure the pace of investment-speciﬁc technological change using the
relative price of investment goods in terms of consumption goods. According to
data constructed by Gordon (1990), this relative price has declined dramatically in
the past 40 years. Based on this observation, Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell
(1997) use growth accounting methods to argue that 60 percent of postwar growth
11in output per man-hour is due to investment-speciﬁc technological change. Using
a VAR identiﬁed by long-run restrictions, Fisher (2003) ﬁnds that investment-
speciﬁc technological change accounts for 50 percent of the variation in hours
worked and 40 percent of the variation in output. In contrast, he ﬁnds that
technology shocks account for less than 10 percent of the variation in either output
or hours. Starting with Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (2000) investment-
speciﬁc technical change has become a standard shock included in RBC models.
Monetary Models
There are a great many studies that expl o r et h er o l eo fm o n e t a r ys h o c k si n
RBC models that are extended to include additional real elements as well as
nominal frictions.8 Researchers such as Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)
emphasize the role of credit frictions in inﬂuencing the response of the economy to
both technology and monetary shocks. Another important real element is monop-
olistic competition, modeled along the lines of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). In basic
RBC models, ﬁrms and workers are price takers in perfectly competitive markets.
In this perfectly competitive environment, it is not meaningful to think of ﬁrms
as choosing prices or workers as choosing wages. Introducing monopolistic com-
petition in product and labor markets gives ﬁrms and workers nontrivial pricing
decisions.
The most important nominal frictions introduced in RBC-based monetary
models are sticky prices and wages. In these models, prices are set by ﬁrms
that commit to supplying goods at the posted prices, and wages are set by work-
ers who commit to supplying labor at the posted wages. Prices and wages can
only be changed periodically or at a cost. Firms and workers are forward looking,
8See, for example, Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1999), Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Lindé (2005), and Smets and Wouters (2003). Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) and Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) provide reviews of this literature.
12so in setting prices and wages, they take into account that it can be too costly, or
simply impossible, to change prices and wages in the near future.
This new generation of RBC-based monetary models can generate impulse
responses to a monetary shock that are similar to the responses estimated using
VAR techniques. In many of these models, technology shocks continue to be
important, but monetary forces play a signiﬁcant role in shaping the economy’s
response to technology shocks. In fact, both Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Linde (2004) and Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2004) ﬁnd that in their models, a
large short-run expansionary impact of a technology shock requires that monetary
policy be accommodative.
Multiple Equilibrium Models
Many papers examine models that display multiple rational expectations equi-
libria. Early research on multiple equilibrium relied heavily on overlapping-
generations models, partly because these models can often be studied without
resorting to numerical methods. In contrast, the most recent work on multiple
equilibrium, discussed in Farmer (1999), takes the basic RBC model as a point of
departure and searches for the most plausible modiﬁcations that generate multiple
equilibrium.
In basic RBC models, we can compute the competitive equilibrium as a so-
lution to a concave planning problem. This problem has a unique solution, and
so the competitive equilibrium is also unique. When we introduce features such
as externalities, increasing returns to scale, or monopolistic competition, we can
no longer compute the competitive equilibrium by solving a concave planning
problem. Therefore these features open the door to the possibility of multiple
equilibria. Early versions of RBC-based multiple equilibrium models required im-
plausibly high markups or large increasing returns to scale. However, there is
13a recent vintage of multiple equilibrium models that use more plausible calibra-
tions. (See, for example Wen (1998a), Benhabib and Wen (2003), and Jaimovich
(2004b).)
Multiple equilibrium models have two attractive features. First, since beliefs
are self-fulﬁlling, belief shocks can generate business cycles. If agents become
pessimistic and think that the economy is going into a recession, the economy
does indeed slowdown. Second, multiple equilibrium models tend to have strong
internal persistence, so such models do not need serially correlated shocks to
generate persistent macroeconomic time series. Starting with a model that has
a unique equilibrium and introducing multiplicity means reducing the absolute
value of characteristic roots from above one to below one. Roots that switch from
outside to inside the unit circle generally assume absolute values close to one, thus
generating large internal persistence.
The strong internal persistence mechanisms of multiple equilibrium models are
a clear advantage vis-à-vis standard RBC models. Although there are exceptions,
such as the model proposed in Wen (1998b), most RBC models have weak internal
persistence. (See Cogley and Nason (1995) for a discussion.) Figure 1 shows that
the dynamics of diﬀerent variables resemble the dynamics of the technology shock.
Watson (1993) shows that as a result of weak internal persistence, basic RBC
models fail to match the properties of the spectral density of major macroeconomic
aggregates.
An important diﬃculty with the current generation of multiple equilibrium
models is that they require that beliefs be volatile, but coordinated across agents.
Agents must often change their views about the future, but they must do so in a
coordinated manner. This interest in beliefs has given rise to a literature, surveyed
by Evans and Honkapohja (2001), that studies the process by which agents learn
about the economic environment and form their expectations about the future.
14Endogenous Business Cycles
The literature on “endogenous business cycles” studies models that generate
business ﬂuctuations, but without relying on exogenous shocks. Fluctuations
result from complicated deterministic dynamics. Boldrin and Woodford (1990)
note that many of these models are based on the neoclassical growth model, and
so have the same basic structure as RBC models. Reichlin (1997) stresses two
diﬃculties with this line of research. The ﬁrst is that perfect foresight paths are
extremely complex raising questions as to the plausibility of the perfect foresight
assumption. The second is that models with determinist cycles often exhibit
multiple equilibria so they are susceptible to the inﬂuence of belief shocks.
Other Lines of Research
I ﬁnish by describing two promising lines of research that are still in their early
stages. The ﬁrst line, discussed by Cochrane (1994), explores the possibility that
“news shocks” may be important drivers of business cycles. Suppose that agents
learn that there is a new technology, such as the internet, that will be available in
t h ef u t u r ea n dw h i c hi sl i k e l yt oh a v eas i g n i ﬁcant impact on future productivity.
Does this news generate an expansion today? Suppose that later on, the impact of
this technology is found to be smaller than previously expected. Does this cause
a recession? Beaudry and Portier (2004) show that standard RBC models cannot
generate comovement between consumption and investment in response to news
about future productivity. Future increases in productivity raise the real rate of
return to investing, and, at the same time, generate a positive wealth eﬀect. If
the wealth eﬀect dominates, consumption and leisure rise, and hours worked and
output fall. Since consumption rises and output falls, investment has to fall. If
the real rate of return eﬀect dominates, which happens for a high elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution, then investment and hours worked rise. However, in this
15case, output does not increase suﬃciently to accommodate the rise in investment
so consumption falls. Beaudry and Portier take an important ﬁr s ts t e pi np r o p o s -
ing a model that generates the right comovement in response to news about future
increases in productivity. This model requires strong complementarity between
durables and nondurables consumption, and abstracts from capital as an input
into the production of investment goods. Producing alternatives to the Beaudry
and Portier model is an interesting challenge to future research.
The second line of research studies the details of the innovation process and its
impact on TFP. Comin and Gertler (2004) extend a RBC model to incorporate
endogenous changes in TFP and in the price of capital that results from research
and development. Although they focus on medium-run cycles, their analysis is
likely to have implications at higher frequencies. More generally, research on the
adoption and diﬀusion of new technologies is likely to be important in understand-
ing economic expansions.
Labor Markets Most business cycle models require high elasticities of labor
supply to generate ﬂuctuations in aggregate variables of the magnitude that we
observe in the data. In RBC models, these high elasticities are necessary to match
the high variability of hours worked, together with the low variability of real wage
rates or labor productivity. In monetary models, high labor supply elasticities are
required to keep marginal costs ﬂat and reduce the incentives for ﬁrms to change
prices in response to a monetary shock. Multiple equilibrium models also rely
on high elasticities of labor supply. If agents believe the economy is entering a
period of expansion, the rate of return on investment must rise to justify the high
level of investment necessary for beliefs to be self-fulﬁlling. This rise in returns on
investment is more likely to occur if additional workers can be employed without
a substantial increase in real wage rates.
16Microeconomic studies estimate that the elasticity of labor supply is low.
These estimates have motivated several authors to propose mechanisms that make
a high aggregate elasticity of labor supply compatible with low labor supply elas-
ticities for individual workers. The most widely used mechanism of this kind was
proposed by Rogerson (1988) and implemented by Hansen (1985) in a RBC model.
In the Hansen-Rogerson model, labor is indivisible, so workers have to choose be-
tween working full time or not working at all. Rogerson shows that this model
displays a very high aggregate elasticity of labor supply that is independent of the
labor supply elasticity of individual workers. This property results from the fact
that in the model all variation in hours worked comes from the extensive margin,
i.e., from workers moving in and out of the labor force. The elasticity of labor
supply of an individual worker, (i.e. the answer to the question “if your wage
increased by one percent, how many more hours would you choose to work?”) is
irrelevant, because the number of hours worked is not a choice variable.
In RBC-based monetary models, sticky wages are often used to generate a
high elasticity of labor supply. In sticky wage models, nominal wages only change
sporadically and workers commit to supplying labor at the posted wages. In the
short run, ﬁrms can employ more hours without paying higher wage rates. But
when ﬁrms do so, workers are oﬀ their labor supply schedule, working more hours
that they would like, given the wage they are being paid. Consequently, both the
worker and the ﬁrm can be better oﬀ by renegotiating toward an eﬃcient level of
hours worked. (See Barro (1977) and Hall (2005) for a discussion). More generally,
sticky wage models raise the question of whether wage rates are allocational over
the business cycle. Can ﬁrms really employ workers for as many hours as they see
ﬁta tt h eg o i n gn o m i n a lw a g er a t e ?
Hall (2005) proposes a matching model in which sticky wages can be an equi-
librium outcome. He exploits the fact that in matching models there is a surplus
17to be shared between the worker and the ﬁrm. The conventional assumption in
the literature is that this surplus is divided by a process of Nash bargaining. In-
stead, Hall assumes that the surplus is allocated by keeping the nominal wage
constant. In his model, wages are sticky as long as the nominal wage falls within
the bargaining set. However, there are no opportunities to improve the position
of either the ﬁrm or the worker by renegotiating the number of hours worked after
as h o c k .
Most business cycle models adopt a rudimentary description of the labor mar-
ket. Firms hire workers in competitive spot labor markets and there is no unem-
ployment. The Hansen-Rogerson model does generate unemployment. However,
one unattractive feature of the model is that participation in the labor force is
dictated by a lottery that makes the choice between working and not working
convex.
Two important research topics in the interface between macroeconomics and
labor economics are understanding the role of wages and the dynamics of unem-
ployment. Macroeconomists have made signiﬁcant process on the latter topic.
Search and matching models, such as the one proposed by Mortensen and Pis-
sarides (1994), have emerged as a framework that is suitable for understanding
not only the dynamics of unemployment, but also the properties of vacancies and
of ﬂows in and out of the labor force. Merz (1995), Andolfatto (1996), Alvarez
and Veracierto (2000), Den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000), Gomes, Green-
wood, and Rebelo (2001), and others have incorporated search into RBC models.
However, as discussed by Shimer (2005), there is still work to be done on pro-
ducing a model that can replicate the patterns of comovement and volatility of
unemployment, vacancies, wages, and average labor productivity present in U.S.
data.
18What Explains Business Cycle Comovement? One of the pioneer papers
in the RBC literature, Long and Plosser (1983), emphasizes the comovement of
diﬀerent sectors of the economy as an important feature of business cycles. These
authors propose a multisector model that exhibits strong sectoral comovement.
Long and Plosser obtain an elegant analytical solution to their model by assuming
that the momentary utility is logarithmic and the rate of capital depreciation is
100 percent. However, many properties of the model do not generalize once we
move away from the assumption of full depreciation.
Figures 3 and 4 show the strong comovement between employment in diﬀerent
industries as emphasized by Christiano and Fitzgerald (1998).9 Figure 3 shows
that, with the exception of mining, the correlation between hours worked in the
major sectors of the U.S. economy (construction, durable goods producers, non-
durable goods producers, and services) and aggregate private hours is at least
80 percent. The average correlation is 75 percent. Figure 4 shows that this co-
movement is also present when I consider a more disaggregated classiﬁcation of
industries. The average correlation of total hours worked in an industry and the
total hours worked in the private sector is 68 percent. The correlation between
industry hours and total hours workers were employed by the private sector is
above roughly 50 except in mining, tobacco, and petroleum and coal. Hornstein
(2000) shows that this sectoral comovement is present in other measures of eco-
nomic activity, such as gross output, value added, and materials and energy use.
These strong patterns of sectoral comovement motivate Lucas (1977) to argue
that business cycles are driven by aggregate shocks, not by sector-speciﬁcs h o c k s .
Figures 5 and 6 show that, as discussed in Carlino and Sill (1998) and Koupar-
itsas (2001), there is substantial comovement across regions of the U.S. and across
9I constructed these ﬁgures using monthly data from January 1964 to April 2003. I detrended
the data with the HP ﬁlter, using a value of λof 14,400. I then used the detrended data to
compute the correlations.
19diﬀerent countries.10 The average correlation between Real Gross State prod-
uct and aggregate real GDP for diﬀerent U.S. states is 58 percent, with only a
small number of states exhibiting low or negative correlation with aggregate out-
put. Figure 6 shows the correlation between detrended GDP the U.S. and the
remaining countries in the G7.11 The average correlation is 46 percent. There is
signiﬁcant comovement across countries, but this comovement is less impressive
than that across U.S. industries or U.S. states. Backus and Kehoe (1992), Baxter
(1995), and Ambler, Cardia, and Zimmermann (2004) discuss these patterns of
international comovement.
At ﬁrst sight, it may appear that comovement across diﬀerent industries is
easy to generate if we are willing to assume there is a productivity shock that is
common to all sectors. However, Christiano and Fitzgerald (1998) show that even
in the presence of a common shock, it is diﬃcult to generate comovement across
industries that produce consumption and investment goods. This diﬃculty results
from the fact that when there is a technology shock, investment increases by much
more than does consumption. In a standard two-sector model this shock response
implies that labor should move from the consumption sector to the investment sec-
tor. As a result, hours fall in the consumption goods sector in times of expansion.
Greenwood, et al. (2000) show that comovement between investment and con-
sumption industries is also diﬃcult to generate in models with investment-speciﬁc
technical change.
One natural way to introduce comovement is to incorporate an input-output
10I computed the correlations reported in Figure 5 using annual data from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis on Real Gross State Product (GSP) for the period 1977-1997. A discontinuity
in the GSP deﬁnition prevents me from using the 1998-2003 observations. I detrended the data
with the HP ﬁlter, using a λ of 100.
11I computed these correlations using annual data for the period 1960-200 from the Heston,
Summers, and Aten (2002) data set for the G7 (data for Germany is for the period 1970-1990).
I detrended the data with the HP ﬁlter, using a λ of 100.
20structure into the model (see, for example, Hornstein and Praschnik (1997), Hor-
vath (2000), and Dupor (1999)). However, because input-output matrices are
relatively sparse, intersectoral linkages do not seem to be strong enough to be a
major source of comovement.
Other potential sources of comovement that deserve further exploration are
costs to moving production factors across sectors (Boldrin, et al. (2001)) and
sticky wages (DiCecio (2003)).
The comovement patterns illustrated in Figures 3 through 6 are likely to con-
tain important clues about the shocks and mechanisms that generate business
cycles. Exploring the comovement properties of business cycle models is an im-
portant, but under-researched topic in macroeconomics.
4. Conclusion
Methodological revolutions such as the one led by Kydland and Prescott (1982)
are rare. They propose new methods, ask new questions, and open the door to
exciting research. I was very lucky to have been one of many young researchers
who had a chance to participate in the Kydland-Prescott research program and
get a closer look at the mechanics of business cycles.
21References
[1] Alvarez, Fernando and Veracierto, Marcelo “Labor Market Policies in an
Equilibrium Search Model,” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1999, 14: 265-
304, 2000.
[2] Abel, Andrew “Asset Prices under Habit Formation and Catching up with
the Joneses,” American Economic Review, 80: 38—42, 1990.
[3] Altig, David, Lawrence J. Christiano, Martin Eichenbaum, and Jesper Linde
“Firm-Speciﬁc Capital, Nominal Rigidities and the Business Cycle,” mimeo,
Northwestern University, 2004.
[4] Ambler, Steve, Emanuela Cardia, and Christian Zimmermann “Interna-
tional Business Cycles: What are the Facts?,” Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 51: 257-276, 2004.
[5] Andolfatto, David “Business Cycles and Labor-Market Search,” American
Economic Review, 86: 112—132, 1996.
[6] Backus, David and Patrick Kehoe “International Evidence on the Historical
Properties of Business Cycles,” American Economic Review, 82: 864-88,
1992.
[7] Barsky, Robert and Lutz Kilian “Oil and the Macroeconomy Since the
1970s,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18: 115—134, 2004.
[8] Barro, Robert J. “Long-Term Contracting, Sticky Prices, and Monetary
Policy,”Journal of Monetary Economics, 3: 305—316, 1977.
[9] Basu, Susanto “Procyclical Productivity, Increasing Returns or Cyclical Uti-
lization?,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111: 719-751, 1996.
22[10] Basu, Susanto, John Fernald, and Miles Kimball “Are Technology Improve-
ments Contractionary?,” mimeo, University of Michigan, 1999.
[11] Baxter, Marianne “International Trade and Business Cycles,” in G. Gross-
man and K. Rogoﬀ (eds.) Handbook of International Economics, vol. 3,
1801-64, Elsevier Science Publishers, B.V., Amsterdam, 1995.
[12] Baxter, Marianne, and Mario Crucini “Explaining Saving-investment Cor-
relations,” American Economic Review, 83: 416—436, 1993.
[13] Baxter Marianne, and Robert King “Fiscal Policy in General Equilibrium,”
American Economic Review, 83: 315-334, 1993.
[14] Beaudry, Paul and Franck Portier “An exploration into Pigou’s theory of
cycles,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 51: 1183-1216, 2004.
[15] Benhabib, Jess and Yi Wen “Indeterminacy, Aggregate Demand, and the
Real Business Cycles,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 51: 503-530, 2003.
[16] Bernanke, Ben, Mark Gertler and Simon Gilchrist “The Financial Acceler-
ator in a Quantitative Business Cycle Framework,” Handbook of Macroeco-
nomics, edited by John B. Taylor and Michael Woodford, Amsterdam, New
York and Oxford: Elsevier Science, North-Holland, 1341-93: 1999.
[17] Boldrin, Michelle and Michael Woodford, “Equilibrium Models Displaying
Endogenous Fluctuations and Chaos: A Survey,” Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 25: 189-222, 1990.
[18] Boldrin, Michelle, Lawrence J. Christiano, and Jonas Fisher “Habit Persis-
tence, Asset Returns, and the Business Cycle,” American Economic Review,
91: 149—166, 2001.
23[19] Braun, R. Anton “Tax Disturbances and Real Economic Activity in the
Postwar United States,” Journal Of Monetary Economics, 33: 441-462,
1994.
[20] Burns, Arthur and Wesley Mitchell Measuring Business Cycles,N a t i o n a l
Bureau of Economic Research, New York, 1946.
[21] Burnside, Craig and Martin Eichenbaum “Factor-Hoarding and the Propa-
gation of Business-Cycle Shocks,” American Economic Review, 86: 1154—74,
1996.
[22] Burnside, Craig, Martin Eichenbaum, and Jonas Fisher, “Assessing the Ef-
fects of Fiscal Shocks,” Journal of Economic Theory, 115: 89-117, 2004.
[23] Burnside, Craig, Martin Eichenbaum, and Sergio Rebelo, “Labor Hoarding
and the Business Cycle,” Journal of Political Economy, 101: 245-73, 1993.
[24] Burnside, Craig, Martin Eichenbaum, and Sergio Rebelo “Sectoral Solow
Residuals,” European Economic Review, 40: 861-869, 1996.
[25] Campbell, John and John Cochrane, “By Force of Habit: A Consumption-
based Explanation of Aggregate Stock Market Behavior,” Journal of Polit-
ical Economy, 107: 205—251, 1999.
[26] Carlino, Gerald and Keith Sill “The Cyclical Behavior of Regional Per
Capita Income in the Post War Period,” mimeo, Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia, 1998.
[27] Chari, V. V. and Kehoe, Patrick J., “Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Pol-
icy,” in John B. Taylor and Michael Woodford, eds., Handbook of Macroeco-
nomics, Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier Science, 1671-1745, 1999.
24[28] Chari, V. V., Patrick J. Kehoe, and Ellen McGrattan “Are Structural VARs
Useful Guides for Developing Business Cycle Theories?,” Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis,Working Paper 631, 2004.
[29] Christiano, Lawrence and Martin Eichenbaum, “Current Real Business Cy-
cle Theories and Aggregate Labor Market Fluctuations,” American Eco-
nomic Review, 82: 430-50, 1992.
[30] Christiano, Lawrence J. and Terry J. Fitzgerald. “The Business Cycle: It’s
Still a Puzzle,” Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Economic Perspectives,2 2 :
56-83, 1998.
[31] Christiano, Lawrence, Martin Eichenbaum, and Robert Vigfusson “What
Happens After a Technology Shock?,” mimeo, Northwestern University,
2003.
[32] Christiano, Lawrence J., Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles Evans “Monetary
P o l i c yS h o c k s :W h a tH a v eW eL e a r n e da n dt oW h a tE n d ? ”i nHandbook
of Macroeconomics, vol. 1A, edited by Michael Woodford and John Taylor,
Amsterdam; New York and Oxford: Elsevier Science, North-Holland, 1999.
[33] Christiano, Lawrence, Roberto Motto and Massimo Rostagno, “The Great
Depression and the Friedman-Schwartz Hypothesis,” forthcoming, Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking, 2005.
[34] Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gali, and Mark Gertler, “The Science of Monetary
Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective,” Journal of. Economic Literature,
37: 1661-1707, 1999.
[35] Cochrane, John H. “Shocks,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Pub-
lic Policy, 41: 295-364, 1994.
25[36] Cogley, Timothy and James Nason “Output Dynamics in Real Business
Cycle Models,” American Economic Review, 85: 492-511, 1995.
[37] Cole, Harold L. and Lee E. Ohanian “The Great Depression in the United
States From A Neoclassical Perspective,” Federal Reserve Bank of Min-
neapolis Quarterly Review, 23: 2—24, 1999.
[38] Cole, Harold L. and Lee E. Ohanian “New Deal Policies and the Persis-
tence of the Great Depression: A General Equilibrium Analysis,” Journal
of Political Economy, 112: 779-816, 2004.
[39] Cooley, Thomas F., and Lee E. Ohanian. “Postwar British Economic Growth
and the Legacy of Keynes,” J o u r n a lo fP o l i t i c a lE c o n o m y , 87: 23-40, 1997.
[40] Comin, Diego and Mark Gertler “Medium Term Business Cycles,” mimeo
New York University, 2004.
[41] Constantinides, George “Habit Formation: A Resolution of the Equity Pre-
mium Puzzle,” Journal of Political Economy, 98: 519—43, 1990.
[42] Den Haan, Wouter, Garey Ramey, and Joel Watson “Job Destruction and
Propagation of Shocks,” American Economic Review, 90: 482—498, 2000.
[43] DiCecio, Riccardo “Comovement: It’s Not a Puzzle,” mimeo, Northwestern
University, November, 2003.
[44] Dixit, Avinash and Joseph Stiglitz “Monopolistic Competition and Opti-
mum Product Diversity,” American Economic Review, 67: 297—308, 1977.
[45] Dotsey, Michael, Robert, G. King, and Alexander L. Wolman, “State-
Dependent Pricing and the General Equilibrium Dynamics of Money and
Output,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114: 655-90, 1999.
26[46] Dupor, Bill, “Aggregation and Irrelevance in Multi-sector Models,” Journal
of Monetary Economics 43: 391—409, 1999.
[47] Evans, Charles L., “Productivity Shocks and Real Business Cycles,” Journal
of Monetary Economics 29: 191-208, 1992.
[48] Evans, George W. and Seppo Honkapohja Learning and Expectations in
Macroeconomics, Princeton University Press, 2001.
[49] Farmer, Roger, Macroeconomics of Self-fulﬁlling Prophecies, 2nd Edition,
MIT Press, 1999.
[50] Finn, Mary, “Perfect Competition and the Eﬀects of Energy Price Increases
on Economic Activity,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 32: 400-416,
2000.
[51] Fisher, Jonas “Technology Shocks Matter,” mimeo, Federal Reserve Bank
of Chicago, 2003.
[52] Francis, Neville and Valerie Ramey “Is the Technology-Driven Real Business
Cycle Hypothesis Dead? Shocks and Aggregate Fluctuations Revisited, ”
mimeo, University of California, San Diego, 2001.
[53] Friedman, Milton “The Role of Monetary Policy,” The American Economic
Review, 58: 1-17, 1968.
[54] Gali, Jordi “Technology, Employment, and the Business Cycle: Do Technol-
ogy Shocks Explain Aggregate Fluctuations?,” American Economic Review,
89: 249-271, 1999.
27[55] Gali, Jordi, David Lopez-Salido, and Javier Valles “Technology Shocks and
Monetary Policy: Assessing the Fed’s Performance,” Journal of Monetary
Economics, 50: 723 - 743, 2004.
[56] Gali, Jordi and Pau Rabanal “Technology Shocks and Aggregate Fluctua-
tions: How Well Does the RBC Model Fit Postwar U.S. Data?,” forthcom-
ing, NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2004, 2005 MIT Press.
[57] Gomes, Joao, Jeremy Greenwood, and Sergio Rebelo “Equilibrium Unem-
ployment,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 48: 109—152, 2001.
[58] Gordon, Robert J. The Measurement of Durable Goods Prices,U n i v e r s i t y
of Chicago Press for National Bureau of Economic Research, 1990.
[59] Greenwood, Jeremy, Zvi Hercowitz, and Per Krusell “Long-Run Implications
of Investment-Speciﬁc Technological Change,” American Economic Review,
87: 342-362, 1997.
[60] Greenwood, Jeremy, Zvi Hercowitz, and Per Krusell “The Role of
Investment-speciﬁc Technological Change in the Business Cycle,” European
Economic Review, 44: 91-115, 2000.
[61] Hall, Robert “The Relation Between Price and Marginal Cost in U.S. In-
dustry,” Journal of Political Economy, 96: 921-47, 1988.
[62] Hall, Robert “Employment Fluctuations with Equilibrium Wage Stickiness,”
forthcoming, American Economic Review, 2005.
[63] Hall, Robert, Martin Feldstein, Jeﬀrey Frankel, Robert Gordon, Christina
Romer, David Romer, and Victor Zarnowitz “The NBER’s Recession Dating
Procedure,” mimeo NBER, 2003.
28[64] Hansen, Gary D. “Indivisible Labor and the Business Cycle,” Journal of
Monetary Economics, 56: 309—327, 1985.
[65] Heston, Alan, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Ver-
sion 6.1, Center for International Comparisons at the University of Penn-
sylvania, 2002.
[66] Hodrick, Robert and Edward Prescott “Post-war Business Cycles: An Em-
pirical Investigation,” Working Paper, Carnegie-Mellon University, 1980.
[67] Hornstein, Andreas “The Business Cycle and Industry Comovement,” Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly Volume 86/1 Winter
2000.
[68] Hornstein, Andreas and Jack Praschnik “Intermediate Inputs and Sectoral
Comovement in the Business Cycle,” Journal of Monetary Economics,4 0 :
573—95, 1997.
[69] Horvath, Michael, “Sectoral Shocks and Aggregate Fluctuations,” Journal
of Monetary Economics 45: 69—106, 2000.
[70] Jaimovich, Nir “Firm Dynamics, Markup Variations, and the Business Cy-
cle,” mimeo, University of California, San Diego, 2004a.
[71] Jaimovich, Nir “Firm Dynamics and Markup Variations: Implications for
Multiple Equilibria and Endogenous Economic Fluctuations,” University of
California, San Diego, 2004b.
[72] Kim, In-Moo and Prakash Loungani “The Role of Energy in Real Business
Cycle Models,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 29: 173-90, 1992
29[73] King, Robert G. “Value and Capital in the Equilibrium Business Cycle
Program,” in Lionel McKenzie and Stefano Zamagni, Value and Capital
Fifty Years Later, MacMillan (London), 1991.
[74] King, Robert, Charles Plosser, and Sergio Rebelo “Production, Growth and
Business Cycles: I. the Basic Neoclassical Model,” Journal of Monetary
Economics, 21: 195-232, 1988.
[75] King, Robert G. and Sergio Rebelo “Resuscitating Real Business Cycles,”
in John Taylor and Michael Woodford, eds., Handbook of Macroeconomics,
volume 1B, 928-1002, 1999.
[76] Kouparitsas, Michael “Is the United States an Optimum Currency Area? An
Empirical Analysis of Regional Business Cycles,” mimeo, Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago, 2001.
[77] Kydland, Finn E. and Edward C. Prescott “Time to Build and Aggregate
Fluctuations,“ Econometrica 50: 1345-1370, 1982.
[78] Kydland, Finn E. and Edward C. Prescott “Business Cycles: Real Facts and
aM o n e t a r yM y t h , ”Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review,
14: 3-18, 1990.
[79] Long, John and Charles Plosser “Real Business Cycles,” Journal of Political
Economy, 91: 39-69, 1983.
[80] Lucas, Robert E., Jr. “Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy,” Econometrica
46: 1429—1445, 1978.
[81] Lucas, Robert E., Jr., Understanding Business Cycles, in: K. Brunner and
A. H. Meltzer, eds., Stabilization of the domestic and international economy,
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 5: 7-29, 1977.
30[82] Lucas, Robert E., Jr. “Methods and Problems in Business Cycle Theory,”
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 12: 696-715, 1980.
[83] Lucas, Robert E., Jr., and Prescott, Edward C. “Investment under Uncer-
tainty,” Econometrica, 39: 659-81, 1977.
[84] McGrattan, Ellen R., “The Macroeconomic Eﬀects of Distortionary Taxa-
tion”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 33: 573-601, 1994.
[85] Mehra, Rajnish and Edward C. Prescott “The Equity Premium: A Puzzle,”
Journal of Monetary Economics, 15: 145-161, 1985.
[86] Mehra, Rajnish and Edward C. Prescott “The Equity Premium in Ret-
rospect,” in G. Constantinides, M. Harris and R. Stulz, Handbook of the
Economics of Finance, Elsevier, 2003.
[87] Merz, Monika “Search in the Labor Market and the Real Business Cycle,”
Journal of Monetary Economics, 36: 269—300, 1995.
[88] Mortensen, Dale and Christopher Pissarides, “Job Creation and Job De-
struction in the Theory of Unemployment,”Review of Economic Studies 61,
397-415, 1994.
[89] Ohanian, Lee E. “The Macroeconomic Eﬀects of War Finance in the United
States: World War II and the Korean War,” American Economic Review,
87: 23-40, 1997.
[90] Prescott, Edward “Theory Ahead of Business-Cycle Measurement,”
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 25: 11-44, 1986.
31[91] Ramey, Valerie A. and Matthew D. Shapiro “Costly Capital Reallocation
and the Eﬀects of Government Spending,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference
Series on Public Policy, 48: 145-194, 1998.
[92] Reichlin, Pietro “Endogenous Cycles in Competitive Models: An Overview,”
Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics and Econometrics, 1:175—185, 1997.
[93] Rogerson, Richard “Indivisible Labor, Lotteries and Equilibrium,” Journal
of Monetary Economics, 21: 3-16, 1988.
[94] Rotemberg, Julio and Michael Woodford “Imperfect Competition and the
Eﬀect of Energy Price Increases on Economic Activity,” Journal of Money
Credit and Banking 28: 549-577, 1996.
[95] Shimer, Robert “The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and
Vacancies,” forthcoming, American Economic Review, 2005.
[96] Smets, Frank, and Raf Wouters “An Estimated Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium Model of the Euro Area,” Journal of the European Economic
Association 1: 1123-1175, 2003.
[97] Sundaresan, Suresh M., “Intertemporally Dependent Preferences and the
Volatility of Consumption and Wealth,” Review of Financial Studies 2: 73-
88, 1989.
[98] Watson. Mark “Measures of Fit for Calibrated Models,” Journal of Political
Economy, 101: 1011-1041, 1993.
[99] Wen, Yi, “Capacity Utilization Under Increasing Returns to Scale,” Journal
of Economic Theory, 81: 7-36, 1998a.
32[100] Wen, Yi “Can a Real Business Cycle Model Pass the Watson Test?,” Journal
of Monetary Economics, 42: 185-203, 1998b.





































Output and Technology Shock
Quarters From Start of Recession
Figure 1: An Average Recession in a Real Business Cycle Model
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nFigure 2: Histogram of Quarterly Growth Rates 
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)Figure 3: Correlation between Hours Employed by Industry and Total Hours Employed by Private Sector

















Average Correlation: 75 percent Figure 4: Correlation Between Hours Employed by Industry and Total Hours Employed by the Private Sector






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Average Correlation: 68 percent 
Durables Manufacturing Nondurables Manufacturing ServicesFigure 5: Comovement Across U.S. States
Correlation Between Real Gross State Product and Aggregate U.S. Real GDP 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Average Correlation = 0.58Figure 6: Comovement Of Different Countries With U.S.
Correlation Between Country Real GDP and U.S. Real GDP
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